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TASK ALLOCATION STRATEGIES AND MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES IN 
ADVANCED SERVICES OFFSHORING 
 
ABSTRACT 
Global service firms are increasingly moving advanced tasks to popular offshoring 
destinations such as India. Despite the significant influence of micro-level 
motivational mechanisms on the implementation and success of such offshoring 
strategies, empirical research in this area is still in its early stages. In this paper, 
taking a grounded theory approach, we present qualitative data from a German 
electronics firm working with IT developers in a Bangalore subsidiary, and the UK 
division of a large global professional services firm which has offshored its tax 
reporting work to a captive unit in Bangalore. From a cross-case analysis of these 
two settings, we develop a grounded model of the complex interdependencies 
between offshoring strategies and offshore-onshore motivational processes. We 
identify three interlocking and self-reinforcing circles between (a) task allocation 
strategies, (b) motivational processes onshore, and (c) motivational processes 
offshore. These circles function to either inhibit or support the offshoring strategies. 
We highlight several theoretical and practical contributions with regard to micro-
macro level interdependencies in offshoring strategies of global firms.  
INTRODUCTION 
With the growing maturity of services offshoring, companies are now transferring 
increasingly complex, knowledge intensive tasks to offshore destinations. This 
development is part of a trend towards more a ‘transformational’ global sourcing 
strategy, which aims at value enhancement as opposed to cost savings alone, and 
leads to a redefinition of the firm’s organisational configuration (Jensen & Petersen, 
2013; Kedia & Lahiri, 2007), for example in terms of responsibilities and customer 
interfaces around the world. When advanced and complex tasks are moved offshore, 
the offshore unit provides critical resources and input to the home unit, and is e 
assigned with greater responsibilities than is usually the case in typical offshoring 
scenarios (Jensen & Petersen, 2013).  
In transferring more advanced tasks to offshore destinations, managers are 
faced with the question: what types of activities have the potential to be completed 
offshore successfully, given the risks involved? The literature emphasizes a number 
of key considerations that play a role   including characteristics of the concerned 
tasks, the organisational and environmental context, and formal and relational 
governance mechanisms. By contrast, only a small number of studies have 
highlighted the micro-level motivational processes that underpin a firm’s offshoring 
strategy. This is surprising, given that employees, both onshore and offshore, are the 
ones who put a particular offshoring strategy into practice, and therefore have to be 
motivated to do so. Onshore employees are involved in moving tasks and associated 
knowledge to the offshore destination, and offshore employees are expected to fully 
embrace these tasks and obtain the required knowledge. At a more general level, 
this research gap also ties into the lack of inquiries into micro (individual and group) 
level foundations that underlie the implementation of an organisational level strategy 
(e.g. Foss, 2011).  
To address the open issues, we take a grounded theory approach and explore 
the motivational processes amongst onshore and offshore employees that are 
involved in the implementation of an organisation’s offshoring strategy. We draw our 
data from two cases. The first case is a major German electronics firm which has 
offshored large parts of its IT development to a subsidiary unit in Bangalore, India. 
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The second case is the UK division of a large US based professional services firm, 
which has offshored large parts of its tax reporting work to a captive unit in Bangalore. 
From a comparative analysis of these two cases, we develop a grounded theory of 
the complex interdependencies between offshoring task allocation strategies, and 
onshore-offshore motivational processes.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Offshoring of advanced tasks 
When designing a firm’s offshoring strategy, managers need to decide what types of 
tasks can be successfully offshored. Several scholars (e.g., Doh et al., 2009; Jensen, 
2012) have observed that this decision cannot be made at the broad level of value 
chain elements (such as sales, research and development, or procurement) alone, 
given the diversity of activities within each element of the value chain. Instead, they 
argue for an ‘activity-based view’ of offshoring (Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003) 
which considers the specific nature of the activities involved in each element of the 
value chain. These considerations become even more relevant and more complex 
with the relocation of more advanced tasks to offshore destinations, which promises 
particularly large benefits, but also tends to involve greater costs and risks.  
With regard to benefits, the transfer of more advanced tasks is designed not 
only to save costs, but also to create value for the firm, for example by gaining 
access to superior talent and to foreign markets. Recent research has identified 
several characteristics of tasks that determine how easily they can be transferred to 
an offshore destination. This stream of research has also observed that more 
advanced the tasks the harder they are to offshore, given the higher communication 
and coordination costs (e.g. Dibbern, Winkler, & Heinzl, 2008; Moller-Larsen et al., 
2012; Stringfellow, Teagarden, & Nie, 2008). In particular, increased requirements of 
contextual and tacit knowledge, task complexity and demands for customisation can 
create many difficulties for both onshore and offshore employees. Task complexity, 
for example in terms of the scale of the outsourcing service and the breadth of tasks 
involved in each service, can contribute to communication and coordination costs 
(Handley & Benton, 2013; Karmakar, 2004). Tasks that are highly customised (as 
opposed to standardised) are more difficult to transfer because they require problem 
solving skills and higher levels of knowledge and expertise (Karmakar, 2004). The 
transfer of highly customised tasks from onshore to offshore units therefore tends to 
create high costs in terms of training and ongoing support. Such costs can also 
emerge when offshored tasks involve context-dependent knowledge, for example a 
deeper understanding of IT system architectures, complex end products, or the 
cultural context (e.g. Dibbern et al., 2008). The transfer of tacit (i.e. non-codifiable) 
knowledge is particularly challenging, because it may require extensive socialisation 
(Nonaka, 1994) which is hard to achieve in geographically dispersed collaborations.  
A host of factors are well known to inhibit or facilitate task transfer specifically 
in offshoring settings, and particularly with regard to the transfer of advanced tasks. 
To name just a few, geographical distance (e.g. Cummings, 2011), cultural 
boundaries (e.g. Gregory, 2010) and differences in organisational and national 
environments (Levina & Vaast, 2008) tend to create barriers to communication and 
shared understanding, which are particularly important for transferring tasks that 
require high levels of tacit knowledge, are complex, and highly customised - i.e. 
advanced tasks. Several well-known mechanisms can help to overcome these 
barriers, for example strong social capital between onshore and offshore units 
(Rottman, 2008; Zimmermann & Ravishankar, 2013), as well as formal and relational 
governance (e.g. Gopal & Koka, 2012). Besides communication and coordination 
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costs, managers have to assess whether an offshoring strategy contains serious 
risks, in particular to intellectual property (Bidanda et al., 2006) and to the 
competence base at the home unit (Kotabe, Mol, & Ketkar, 2008). These risks 
become even more significant when the transferred tasks are more advanced, 
involving higher levels of knowledge and competence.  
Motivational processes of advanced task offshoring 
Even when an offshoring strategy seems reasonable from a broad strategic 
perspective, its feasibility depends on the motivation of those responsible – both 
onshore as well as offshore - for implementing it. Little is known about these 
motivational processes, but a small number of studies do indicate how they may be 
relevant. 
Motivational processes in the onshore unit. Some studies highlight a 
dissonance between a firm’s ambitions of transferring advanced tasks to an offshore 
unit, and the degree to which employees at the onshore unit support this transfer. 
Firstly, there are cases where onshore employees do not believe that it is possible to 
achieve satisfactory performance at the offshore unit, thus creating doubts about the 
feasibility of the firm’s task allocation strategy. This expectation of insufficient 
performance can be a reason for onshore employees to avoid the transfer of tasks 
wherever possible (Zimmermann et al., 2012). Secondly, the process of transferring 
tasks can create high personal costs for onshore employees, through the increased 
workloads associated with advanced knowledge transfer, communication, and 
coordination requirements. If employees believe that a huge amount of effort is 
demanded of them not only in the initial stages of the offshoring process, but 
throughout the offshoring collaboration, they may withhold advanced tasks within the 
onshore unit where possible, in order to minimise personal effort (Zimmermann & 
Ravishankar, 2013). Onshore employees’ expectations of additional workload 
depend partly on the nature of the tasks to be offshored, and on whether offshore 
recipients are skilled enough to handle such tasks.  
Onshore employees may also believe that the transfer of tasks to an offshore 
location leads to undesirable changes in their own tasks, their careers, and their 
professional role identities (Zimmermann & Ravishankar, 2011). They may even fear 
losing their jobs to the offshore location, which can cause them to either withhold 
tasks or limit their effort in transferring the required knowledge to offshore employees 
(Zimmermann et al., 2012; Zimmermann & Ravishankar, 2013). In extreme cases, 
the fear of losing tasks and jobs has been shown to lead onshore employees to 
unduly criticise their offshore counterparts’ work, avoid interacting with them as much 
as possible (Cohen & El Sawad, 2007; Metiu, 2006; Zimmermann et al., 2012), 
exclude them from their own, higher status onshore group, and to undermine the 
offshore unit’s chances of owning advanced tasks (Metiu, 2006). Obviously, such 
constrained relationships make it hard achieve the organisation’s task transfer 
targets. In some cases, the fears of losing attractive tasks and jobs to offshore 
locations are linked to the question of whether new, alternative tasks are available for 
onshore employees, post-offshoring, which relies partly on the clarity and 
transparency of an offshoring strategy (Zimmermann et al., 2012). Onshore 
employees will also be more inclined to support offshoring of advanced tasks if they 
expect the risks to be tolerable. In this respect, Jensen and Petersen (2013) point out 
that the decision on advanced task offshoring depends on the responsible managers’ 
‘comfort zone’, which is a composite of the managers’ risk perception, risk tolerance, 
and the organisation’s risk-reducing measures.  
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From a theoretical perspective, the motivational role of employees’ 
expectations regarding performance, workload, losing attractive tasks or jobs, as well 
as offshoring risks can be explained in terms of ‘outcome expectations’. According to 
social cognitive theory (SCT, Bandura, 1997), outcome expectations refer to the 
expected consequences of one’s behaviour. If these outcomes are regarded as 
attractive, they motivate behaviour that is believed to lead to these outcomes 
(Bandura, 1997:125). For example, if onshore employees expect that the transfer of 
certain tasks does not endanger tasks or jobs at the onshore unit, and that it will lead 
to desirable performance outcomes and acceptable risks, then they are more likely to 
support the transfer of tasks to the offshore unit. 
  Motivational processes in the offshore unit. Several studies of offshoring 
collaborations have suggested that employees at the offshore unit are ambitious and 
highly motivated to take on higher level tasks and responsibilities in order to gain 
expertise and to progress in their careers (e.g. Mahavedan, 2011; Metiu 2006; 
Ravishankar, Cohen, & El Sawad, 2010; Zimmermann & Ravishankar, 2011). For 
firms implementing an offshoring strategy, such ambitions create the common issue 
of high turnover of skilled offshore employees, as they tend to be high in demand and 
therefore hard to retain at the offshore unit (see Lewin & Couto, 2006). The transfer 
of increasingly advanced tasks to the offshore unit can therefore be also seen as a 
means of talent management, which helps to increase intrinsic work motivation and 
create attractive career prospects for offshore employees, thus motivating them to 
stay with the firm for a longer period of time (see Tymon et al., 2010).  
The implementation of an offshoring strategy for advanced tasks becomes even 
more complex when we consider the potential interactions between onshore and 
offshore motivational processes. Employees at the offshore unit tend to feel under 
serious pressure to prove their worth and to gain onshore employee’s trust in their 
capabilities. Thereby, offshore employees sometimes have to motivate onshore 
employees to transfer attractive tasks (Kelly & Noonan, 2008; Mahadevan, 2011; 
Ravishankar et al., 2010).   
From our review of the literature, it appears that the implementation of 
advanced task offshoring strategies depends not only on task characteristics and 
offshoring specific contextual factors, but also on micro-level motivational 
mechanisms. Prior evidence suggests that there can be a dissonance between an 
organisation’s offshoring strategy and onshore employees’ motivation to put it into 
practice, depending on their outcome expectations. Outcome expectations may, 
conversely, be influenced by elements of the task allocation strategy, namely the 
nature of the transferred tasks in relation to offshore skills, and the prospect of 
alternative tasks for employees at the home unit. Research also suggests offshore 
employees tend to be highly motivated to take on more advanced tasks, and they 
aim to reinforce onshore employees’ motivation to transfer attractive tasks. However, 
all of these observations need to be explored in more depth and supported by more 
evidence.  
Whilst prior case studies provide some relevant evidence, they are small in 
number. The evidence also tends to be fragmented and implicit, with a focus on 
single case settings, predominantly in the IT sector. In order to substantiate the 
above claims, we therefore need to broaden the range of onshore-offshore national 
and industry contexts. In this paper, we build a more comprehensive and explicit 
account of how offshoring strategies and onshore-offshore motivational processes 
are related to each other. We develop a grounded model that offers a deeper 
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understanding of motivational processes and how they underpin the implementation 
and success of task allocation strategies in offshoring settings.  
METHODS 
Rationale 
Our research calls for a qualitative case study methodology, which allows 
researchers to explore new topics and to gain an in-depth understanding of complex 
socio-psychological phenomena in real life contexts. Given the lack of a 
comprehensive conceptualisation of the phenomenon, we decided to take a 
grounded theory approach. We adopt Shapira’s (2011: 1313) definition of theory as 
an ‘analytic structure or system that attempts to explain a particular set of empirical 
phenomena’, to develop a theory that extends to task allocation strategies and 
motivational processes in offshoring settings. This theory is captured in the form of a 
grounded model (Figure 1). A number of pre-existing theoretical concepts (such as 
the notions of transformational offshoring and of outcome expectations) helped us in 
explaining the findings, and we incorporated them into our theory. The resulting 
theory is nevertheless ‘grounded’, because it is only aided by elements of pre-
existing theory, and based much more heavily on our inductive analysis. In line with 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) definition of grounded theory, our theory was thus 
informed by existing theoretical concepts, but formed by the emergent findings. In 
order to gain thorough insights into the motivational processes amongst onshore and 
offshore employees, we based our data on the respondents’ own, reported 
perceptions. By organising and further interpreting these reports in the light of 
existing concepts, as well as our interpretations of contextual factors, we arrived at 
our constructions of the respondents’ constructions of their social reality (see Geertz, 
1973). 
Research setting and respondents 
We followed a purposeful sampling method, aiming at a balance between differences 
and similarities across cases. Whilst the reviewed research has focussed 
predominantly on IT offshoring and single combinations of nationalities, we included 
two companies in two different industry sectors and with different combinations of 
nationalities, to explore the transferability of our findings across these industry and 
country contexts. Both firms operated with captive offshore units, recruited graduates, 
and offshored service tasks which were not voice based. These similarities between 
the cases helped us in determining differences that were due to industry and country 
contexts.  
Our first company case was ELECTRO (pseudonym), a large German 
electronics company that had offshored parts of its software development to a 
captive unit in Bangalore/India. We interviewed German and Indian employees who 
were responsible for developing software for automotive car engines. We included 
two departments. One (AUTOSAFETY, a pseudonym) was responsible for the 
electronics of automotive safety systems, the other (AUTOCONTROL) for developing 
electronic control units. In AUTOSAFETY, the collaboration with India had been set 
up more recently, c. 8 years before the time of data collection, as opposed to c. 20 
years in AUTOCONTROL.  
The second company was a US based professional services firm, 
PROFSERVICE (again a pseudonym). We conducted our research in two tax 
services departments of this firm. The first, EXPAT-TAX (pseudonym), was 
responsible for assisting client firms (headquartered in different countries) with UK-
related tax returns for their expatriates. The second department, CORP-TAX 
(pseudonym), delivered tax services to UK based firms. In these departments, we 
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interviewed UK nationals in the UK units and their Indian counterparts at the firm’s 
captive unit in Bangalore. Respondents worked on ‘accounts’, i.e. teams for particular 
clients.  
We conducted interviews across a broad range of hierarchical levels, in order 
to obtain more strategic, managerial level perspectives, as well as ground level 
experiences. In ELECTRO, the hierarchical levels were organised into engineers, 
project section leaders, project or team leaders, group leaders, and department 
leaders. This organisation was used in the German as well as the Indian units. In 
PROFSERVICE India, the levels were divided into tax analysts, advanced analysts, 
tax seniors, assistant managers, managers, and senior managers. In the UK units of 
PROFSERVICE, the hierarchy started with trainees at ‘level one’, followed by ‘level 2’ 
(which included the ‘senior tax assistants’ that we interviewed), followed by 
managers, senior managers, and partners. Partners were located only in the UK and 
not in the Indian unit. Across levels, we interviewed 62 respondents: 15 German and 
17 Indian employees at ELECTRO, and 11 British and 19 Indian employees at 
PROFSERVICE.  
Data collection and analysis 
The interviews were conducted by the first author; in German language for the 
German respondents and in English for all other respondents. 56 interviews were 
carried out face to face in the respondents’ offices, whilst the remaining six (three in 
each firm) were telephone interviews. The interviews lasted for about an hour on 
average. The interview guide was semi-structured and detailed, but was modified 
strongly throughout the interviewing phase. To illustrate, the focus of the initial 
interviews was on knowledge transfer rather than task transfer, but this focus was 
shifted towards advanced task transfer, when this new theme was emphasised by all 
respondents. Moreover, the focus on motivational processes was not set in the initial 
interviews, but resulted from the respondents’ detailed explanations of motivational 
mechanisms.  
The data collection and analysis phases were intractably intertwined. 
Reflections were noted after each interview, and new themes included in each 
subsequent interview. A preliminary model was drafted after the first few interviews, 
and continuously refined whenever additional factors or dependencies became 
apparent. At the stage where we had reached our focus on task allocation strategies 
and motivational processes, we were able to compare each element to the literature. 
We thus noticed that respondents’ descriptions of increasing advanced task transfer 
resembled the notion of ‘transformational offshoring’. Similarly, we found that 
respondents’ explanations regarding careers prospects, expected performance, and 
workload could be described in terms of the concept ‘outcome expectations’. When 
respondents highlighted how offshore performance depended on their career 
prospects, task ownership, and task experience, we explored this through the lenses 
of ‘outcome expectations’, ‘intrinsic motivation’, and ‘self-efficacy’. These concepts 
helped us in constructing several components of our grounded theory. Throughout 
the interviewing and analysis phase, we carried out comparisons between individual 
respondents, different teams, and between the two different departments in each firm, 
which facilitated several causal explanations. In particular, reported differences in 
actual transfer pointed us to the role of varying motivational processes. 
We carried out the two case studies consecutively (first ELECTRO, then 
PROFSERVICE), which created an intermediate phase of intensive data analysis. 
During this analysis period, all interviews of the first case were transcribed and coded, 
and the preliminary model was developed further to accord with all interviews of the 
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first case. This model then served as a basis for the interviews of the second 
company case. Several differences between the cases became apparent, which we 
explained through sector-specific tasks and environments. These comparisons were 
crucial for determining the contextual factors in our model. To illustrate, the 
comparison between the more positive career expectations in the AUTOSAFETY 
department as opposed to the AUTOCONTROL department in ELECTRO allowed us 
to identify alternative tasks and market demands as important contextual factors that 
affect onshore employees’ motivation to transfer tasks. Moreover, expectations 
regarding performances were generally higher in PROFSERVICE than in ELECTRO, 
and we were able to trace this difference back to the different nature of the end 
product in each firm. The many elements of our model, and their complex 
interactions, were however supported equally by all participants, i.e. by those with 
more positive as well as those with more negative experiences. This makes the 
model an analytic structure that explains a particular set of empirical phenomena, i.e. 
a theory (see Shapira, 2011: 1313). We deemed our model saturated when it was 
fully supported by all data, indicating that theory and data were sufficiently aligned 
with each other. 
RESULTS 
Offshoring strategies at ELECTRO and PROFSERVICE 
In both firms, there was an explicit strategy of transferring increasingly advanced 
tasks to offshore units. The aim was to offshore increasingly complex and 
customised tasks, which required an increasing amount of contextual knowledge and 
understanding. The offshoring strategy took slightly different forms in the context of 
the two organisations and the different departments, with respect to the nature of the 
transferred tasks as well as the level of responsibility that was allocated to the 
offshore units. Table 1 describes the tasks in the two firms with regard to their levels 
of complexity and customisation. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In both ELECTRO departments, the level of the offshored tasks had increased 
dramatically since the beginning of their offshoring operations. Indian counterparts 
were now not only responsible for simple support tasks such as coding or software 
integration, which were typically executed as part of an ‘extended workbench model’. 
In many projects, they were now also involved in software function development and 
system integration, with designated system experts at the offshore unit. Compared to 
coding and integration, these tasks were more complex and customer-specific, and 
therefore required a more comprehensive understanding of the software system, 
architecture, domain, and the end product. With regard to more mature products, 
AUTOCONTROL had also transferred the responsibility and leadership for complete 
projects to the Indian subsidiary, and this was increasingly done in AUTOSAFETY, 
as well. 
In the more experienced AUTOCONTROL department, the additional, long-term 
aim was develop the Indian unit into an independent supplier to all Indian and certain 
other Asian end customers, which would involve full financial project liability and 
accountability towards the customer. AUTOCONTROL participants were highly 
aware of this strategy, which was known as the transnational location concept or 
‘TLC’. At the date of data collection, Indian employees were already participating in 
the direct interface with several Asian customers, and pilots were run to assign them 
with the full customer accountability for Indian customers.  
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In ELECTRO, a clear limitation to advanced task offshoring was set by the 
complexity and context-dependency of the required background understanding, and 
by the geographical location of the end customer. Only a limited amount of Indian 
were seen to stay with the firm for long enough to acquire the necessary system and 
domain knowledge to pursue the highest level technical tasks, in particular new 
function development. Moreover, highly customised tasks, which required an in-depth 
understanding of the customer-specific end product, could be transferred only in 
projects that served Asian end customers. This created a clear cut off point for 
advanced task offshoring as far as new function development for non-Asian 
customers were concerned (see arrow indicating cut-off point in Table 1). 
In PROFSERVICE, the organisational aim was to offshore the highest possible 
amount (that is nearly all) of the compliance work to the offshore unit. Compliance 
tasks included tax computations, at the simpler level, and first order reviews of 
computations at an intermediate level, resulting in tax returns that could be delivered 
to the end customer (see Table 1). In both PROFSERVICE departments, the majority 
of compliance work was therefore completed at the offshore unit. The approach to 
transferring yet more advanced tasks varied strongly between the two departments, 
and between different UK offices within each department.  
Firstly, the two departments diverged with regard to the Indian employees’ 
level of involvement with the customer. In EXPAT-TAX, offshore employees were 
entitled to gather information from the individual clients (i.e. expatriates) directly, 
primarily via shared email accounts, but increasingly also via phone calls. However, 
the contact with the corporate client, such as the HR function of a firm, was held 
mostly within the UK. CORP-TAX, in turn, held customer interfaces only with 
corporate offices, which was due to the nature of the service. Accordingly, the client 
interface was predominantly in the UK. Only a few Indian individuals were tasked 
with gathering information directly from the client, and only in the exceptional case of 
one customer team, the main customer interface resided at the Indian plant. However, 
a small amount of Indian employees in CORP-TAX had the attractive opportunity to 
take on specialist tasks, for example for tax returns that required knowledge of 
industry specific tax regulations. 
With regard to yet more advanced tasks, an increasing amount of offshore 
employees in EXPAT-TAX were qualified to conduct the final review of the returns 
and sign them off (even though the final accountability towards the end customer 
remained on the UK side). Accordingly, several participants in EXPAT-TAX described 
the Indian counterparts as ‘self-sufficient’. In CORP-TAX, by contrast, only initial 
review tasks were completed offshore, and there were no apparent plans for 
transferring the responsibility for the final reviews and sign-offs. It has to be noted, 
however, that compensation work in CORP-TAX was more complex and customised 
than the compensation tasks in EXPAT-TAX, as it required an understanding of 
complex tax structures of different client corporations, rather than individual clients.  
The highest level tasks were in this firm described as advisory work, tax 
accounting and auditing, developing new services for clients, and acquiring new 
clients. Out of these, only some of the auditing and smaller advisory tasks were 
(occasionally) done by Indian employees in the EXPAT-TAX department, and in a 
few customer teams of CORP-TAX. When asked, respondents in the other teams 
stated either that they did not believe these highest level tasks were going to be 
offshored, or that they were not sure about the firm’s long-term plans for transferring 
these advanced tasks. Respondents further explained that a transfer of financial 
liability or the final accountability towards the end customer was not possible. The 
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main limitation to advanced task offshoring in the PROFSERVICE firm resided in the 
location of the end customers. The participants agreed that Indian employees were 
able to acquire the detailed knowledge of complex tax rules that was required to 
complete very complex tax computations. By contrast, their geographic distance did 
not allow them to meet customers as easily, and to gain the same level of 
understanding of specific customer requirements compared to their UK employees, 
which was particularly relevant for the corporate tax return work, and for the most 
advanced tasks such as advisory tasks. Additionally, several participants mentioned 
that language difficulties could create barriers to more demanding interactions with 
the corporate clients. 
Actual task transfer 
In both firms, middle managers had some discretion over the scope and the level of 
tasks to be offshored. Interestingly, onshore managers had embraced the firm’s 
offshoring strategy to varying degrees, and had transferred the more advanced tasks 
to greater or smaller extents. In ELECTRO, some German group and project 
managers had set up large Indian teams who were responsible for software as well 
as system work, and had been very proactive in training their Indian counterparts to 
take on increasingly higher level tasks. By contrast, there were several cases of 
German managers and employees, primarily in the AUTOCONTROL department, 
who were reluctant to transfer higher percentages of work, or more advanced tasks.  
Correspondingly, the leading customer team managers in different 
PROFSERVICE offices in the UK had implemented their firm’s offshoring strategy to 
varying degrees. For example, the London office and certain smaller offices had 
reportedly been particularly quick in transferring nearly all computation tasks to the 
Indian unit, and were also progressive when it came to involving Indian employees in 
the customer interface. By contrast, fewer new tasks seemed to flow from other UK 
offices.  
In what follows, we will explain these variations in actual task transfer through 
underlying motivational mechanisms. Figure 1 captures the companies’ advanced 
task transfer strategy (upper right side), the actual task transfer (middle), and 
relevant motivational mechanisms. We will first analyse the motivational processes 
onshore (lower right hand in Figure 1), before describing those offshore (left hand in 
Figure 1). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Motivational processes in the onshore unit 
We were able to discern a range of motivational mechanisms that explained the 
variations in actual task transfer. We will categorise them as onshore employees’ 
outcome expectations regarding offshore performance, additional workload, and 
onshore careers. These motivational processes became increasingly relevant with 
the rising level of task complexity, customisation, and required contextual knowledge. 
In other words, the more advanced the task to be transferred, the greater the 
differences in onshore employees’ motivation to transfer these tasks.  
Expectations regarding performance. A primary reason for the variations in 
actual task transfer can be seen in onshore employees’ expectations of offshore 
performance, i.e. their beliefs that the task could be completed satisfactorily at the 
offshore unit. This expectation depended firstly on the prior proof of performance 
(see Figure 1, arrow linking 'task performance with performance expectations). 
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Participants at all units explained that onshore employees had become more willing 
to transfer tasks over time, if they had experienced good offshore performance.  
Secondly, performance expectations depended on the task allocation strategy 
itself, namely the match between the tasks to be transferred and the level of offshore 
skills (see Figure 1, arrow linking task allocation strategy with performance 
expectations).  Particularly in some ELECTRO projects, the ramp up of the offshore 
operation had reportedly been too fast, leading to a lack of qualified offshore 
employees to take on the demanding tasks. In the eyes of participants, upper 
management had in these cases allocated insufficient time for recruiting and training 
employees offshore, and for continuous mentoring by experienced onshore 
employees. In these situations, onshore employees experienced the advanced tasks 
offshoring strategy as unrealistic, and withheld tasks wherever possible (see Figure 1, 
arrow linking performance expectations with actual task transfer).  Similarly, a 
manager in CORP-TAX explained that the initial task allocation in CORP-TAX had 
not matched offshore skills, and had therefore not been realistic:  
‘I don’t think the way we did it was good. As in: Most of our problems, I think, were 
actually caused by the fact that we were told: “Everything has to go over there at that 
time, and we were told that the teams over there could do x, y, and z. And so we put 
stuff over there, only to discover that they could not do x, y, and z. So I think the 
biggest message I should give is: Whatever you say one team or the other can 
actually do, has to be correct, rather than aspirational. It should more be: “ This is 
what they can do today, we are going to move and work together, so that by a year 
from now, they can do this without support from the UK … because they did go on a 
massive learning curve in the first year/18 months.’ 
The opposite example can be taken from the EXPAT-TAX department at 
PROFSERVICE. On many customer teams, onshore employees regarded it as 
realistic to assign the Indian side with the advanced task of gathering information 
from individual clients, as this task was in line with the level of technical skills and 
language ability that had been developed at the offshore unit of these customer 
teams. 
Expectations regarding workload. Onshore employees’ expectations 
regarding performance were closely tied to their expectations of the workload that the 
task transfer would create (see Figure 1, arrow linking performance expectations with 
workload expectations).  The more onshore employees expected good performance, 
the less they expected that they would have to support their Indian employees and 
correct their mistakes continuously. In ELECTRO, the coordination workload created 
through offshoring was often seen as unacceptable, due to the insufficient time that 
had been allocated for the transfer. In particular for the transfer of system related 
tasks, there was often insufficient time to transfer the required highly complex and 
context specific knowledge: 
‘I think both managers at either side should be aware of the ground realities and work 
more towards the ground realities.… it's a very limited time, say one month or two 
months or something like that and it is really impossible to capture five years of 
experience in those one or two months.  So if I would have been in such a scenario, 
if I were a manager and I had to send one person for task transfer, first is checking, 
really at the ground level whether this person can really handle the task.  … and I 
think I would give that whole time a bit more longer, say instead of one or two months 
it could be like three or four months …’ (Indian respondent in AUTOCONTROL) 
Expectations regarding careers. In all departments, onshore employees’ 
expectation of outcomes for their careers was described as an important determinant 
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of their motivation to support the transfer. This effect became particularly clear in our 
comparison between the two departments in each firm. In AUTOCONTROL of 
ELECTRO as well as CORP-TAX of PROFSERVICE, alternative tasks for onshore 
employees were relatively scarce. In AUTOCONTROL, many teams worked on 
highly mature products that did not yield many new, innovative tasks. Moreover, only 
a small number of new projects had recently been acquired. In CORP-TAX of 
PROFSERVICE, market growth was limited for the smaller offices.  Several 
employees in these departments therefore felt that the future of onshore tasks and 
even jobs was unsure (see Figure 1, arrow linking alternative market demand with 
alternative tasks and with career expectations). Such uncertain career prospects 
made onshore employees more reluctant to assign advanced tasks to offshore 
employees. (see Figure 1, arrow linking career expectations with actual task transfer). 
As an Indian EXPAT-TAX member put it:  
‘If they themselves are running out of work, they really won’t give that to us.’ 
Fears about the future of onshore tasks and jobs were particularly great if employees 
felt that the firm’s offshoring strategy did not include clear plans for the future 
distribution of tasks between onshore and offshore employees, with clear career 
prospects for onshore employees (see Figure 1, arrow linking task allocation strategy 
with career expectations): 
 ‘If you’re going to move things over there, to explain to people in the UK what’s 
happening - to them. In our firm, nobody has ever come along and said: “Right, ok, 
you got to give all this work to [the offshore unit], and we’re going to give this to you.” 
All there’s ever seen is things being taken away.’ (UK participant at 
PROFSERVICE/CORP-TAX)   
On the opposite end, many teams in AUTOSAFETY as well as EXPAT-TAX, and the 
London office of CORP-TAX, encountered a growing market and had therefore 
gained an abundance of new, challenging customer commissions. These 
opportunities fed into onshore employees’ motivation to involve their Indian 
employees in higher level tasks, to free up space for their own, new projects:  
‘There are spectacular exceptions and one of them is London here, because the 
London economy was never as battered as the rest of the country and London 
decided early on that they would put everything out to Bangalore which meant that 
they didn’t have the option of doing it onshore.  Now they were lucky in that business 
down here was quite buoyant so everyone who was employed here was able to stay 
busy, but they didn’t have the resource to do the work onshore so it had to be done in 
Bangalore and when a team is in that position they certainly make it work; they have 
to make it work. So we found ourselves even in 2009/2010 that the London 
relationship was going significantly better than some others and it had a lot to do with 
the fact that there was nobody onshore worried about their job. … Well, they made 
the effort and made the investments. … they needed the knowledge transfer.  So 
very quickly, we had two people from Bangalore come to London and they actually 
went to work in the [client] office and that went very well indeed (UK participant in 
PROFSERVICE/CORP-TAX). 
In PROFSERVICE, a few respondents also observed that middle managers at 
EXPAT-TAX were measured primarily by their cost savings, which were strongly 
dependent on the amount of offshoring. Moreover, the rewards for cost savings 
through offshoring was seen to influence managers’ career progression. Some 
PROFSERVICE respondents explained that this reward was therefore a strong 
incentive for EXPAT-TAX managers to implement the offshoring strategy, and a 
reason for the quicker implementation of the offshoring strategy in this department. 
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(See Figure 1, arrow linking rewards for offshoring with career expectations, and 
arrow linking career expectations with actual task transfer). In CORP-TAX, by 
contrast, the measure of cost savings through offshoring did not appear to be crucial 
in the assessment and promotion of managers. One respondent also mentioned that 
it had been introduced only a year before the time of data collection. In ELECTRO, 
managers were similarly rewarded for their cost savings, but the amount of costs that 
could be saved through offshoring was perceived as highly opaque.  
Motivational processes in the offshore unit 
 Expectations regarding careers. Not surprisingly, offshore employees in 
both firms were generally very ambitious and keen to take on increasingly advanced 
tasks. A main motive for this was career progression, but advanced tasks were also 
regarded as more interesting and intrinsically rewarding. Notably, there were some 
variations within the ELECTRO departments, due to the nature of the tasks in this 
industry in relation to the education of Indian employees. German ELECTRO 
respondents explained that some Indian employees who had trained as software 
engineers identified with a career path within software engineering, and were 
therefore not particularly interested in the software system, architecture, or the end 
product. These employees were not perceived as very motivated to take on more 
complex, system related tasks. The Germans therefore found it harder to transfer 
more advanced tasks and the required knowledge to these employees, and tried to 
ensure that such tasks were given only to Indian employees who did show a 
motivation to train up for this work. In PROFSERVICE, by contrast, the advanced 
tasks were all related to tax returns and therefore not far removed from Indian 
employees’ professional training, which was usually in accounting or finance subjects.  
There were certain differences in the degrees to which offshore employees 
expected their careers to progress. Like in the onshore departments, employees’ 
career expectations were more positive within AUTOSAFETY of ELECTRO (as 
compared to AUTOCONTROL) and in EXPAT-TAX of PROFSERVICE (as compared 
to CORP-TAX). These differences can be traced back to a number of factors. Firstly, 
the future plans for the transfer of advanced tasks were regarded as more 
transparent in these departments than in the others (i.e. in AUTOCONTROL of 
ELECTRO and CORP-TAX of PROFSERVICE; see Figure 1, arrow linking task 
allocation strategy with career expectations offshore, via ‘transparency’). Indian 
employees were here confident that they would have the chance to acquire higher 
level tasks and progress in their careers in the near future, whilst in AUTOCONTROL 
as well CORP-TAX, there were some worries about whether attractive tasks would 
be transferred in the near future. Along the same lines, Indian employees in 
AUTOCONTROL and CORP-TAX reported that their onshore counterparts did not 
transfer as many tasks as the Indian side had wished for. This corresponds to our 
observation that in these departments, some onshore employees hesitated to 
transfer tasks because of the lack of alternative tasks and worries about their own 
career prospects.  
 Expectations of career prospects had important motivational consequences. 
Lacking career prospects contributed to higher turnover levels, which inhibited the 
development of higher level knowledge and background understanding, which would 
have been required in order to perform well on more advanced tasks and on these 
grounds get promoted (see Figure 1, arrows from career expectations offshore to 
employee retention, to task experience, to background understanding, to task 
competence, and to task performance). As an Indian participant in CORP-TAX 
observed: 
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‘You see, what policy here we have at GTH is in order to get promotion or a good 
rating they say you should have client hours which gives us the experience in terms 
of technical knowledge and dealing with clients and so on. If you don’t get that, 
definitely you will not go into the next role or will not get good ratings. Who will be 
motivated to stay here? Can we wait until 10 years when everything gets settled? 
That is the perception that people are getting. They always think, and it’s quite 
natural also, if you don’t have any hope to see career growth, definitely they’ll think of 
alternative things. I think we’ve lost quite a talented bunch if I look at the last 7 years. 
I think we have lost quite a bit of talented people because there is no scope for 
growth.’ 
Dim career prospects could even lead to a de-moralisation of offshore employees, 
visible in less effort and consequent lower performance (see Figure 1, arrows linking 
career expectations offshore with task effort and with performance). As the same 
Indian respondent in CORP-TAX commented: 
‘The interest they were showing previously they don’t show now and that is also 
affecting work, too, to the extent that there’ll be a lot of reworks required. A person 
working without motivation - it’s very difficult for them.’ 
Task ownership and intrinsic work motivation. The transfer of advanced 
tasks to the offshore units had an important effect on offshore employees’ task 
ownership and intrinsic work motivation (see Figure 1, arrows linking actual task 
transfer with task ownership and intrinsic motivation offshore). The expectations that 
success on advanced tasks would further their careers fed into offshore employees’ 
sense of task ownership (see Figure 1, arrow linking career expectations with task 
ownership). Task ownership and intrinsic motivation, in turn, incited offshore 
employees to stay with the firm for longer, and to engage and spend effort in the 
tasks (see Figure 1, arrows from task ownership and intrinsic motivation to employee 
retention and task effort). As mentioned, both retention and task effort were, naturally, 
important determinants of task performance. These mechanisms were, for example, 
described by a UK participant of CORP-TAX:  
‘So the controllable attrition was fantastic and we did make sure that that was the 
case.  If we’d had a churn model whereby they come in and they leave two years 
later we wouldn’t have cared as much, but it was because of the model we chose 
and also the fact that we need good people.  We don’t need people who can just 
churn through the numbers, we need people who can show initiative and be 
proactive and before long run assignments and we are very happy with the people 
we’ve got. I can say now with seven years’ experience that it’s worked out well.’ 
Task performance efficacy. With increasing task performance, offshore 
employees became more confident in their ability to perform well, which we interpret 
as an increase in ‘self-efficacy’ (see Figure 1, arrow linking task performance with 
task performance efficacy). Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s belief in his or her 
own capabilities to organise and execute courses of actions required to manage 
prospective situations (Bandura, 1997). Such efficacy beliefs influence people’s 
intention to execute the required behaviour, their effort and persistence in that 
behaviour, and, through this, their mastery of this behaviour. With regard to offshore 
employees, this meant that their task related self-efficacy encouraged them to spend 
effort and persevere in the face of difficulties, thus improving their performance (see 
Figure 1, arrows from efficacy to task effort and to performance). The experience of 
successful performance, in turn, reinforced their self-efficacy. This finding is in line 
with prior evidence that successful behaviour reinforces an individual’s efficacy 
beliefs and subsequent effort in the behaviour, leading to a mutual reinforcement 
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between efficacy and performance (Lindsley et al., 1995). With increasing self-
efficacy, Indian employees also felt less shy to demonstrate their competence and 
voice their motivation to take on more demanding tasks when interacting with 
onshore employees (see Figure 1, arrow linking efficacy with demonstrating 
competence and motivation).  
Interdependencies between task allocation strategy and onshore/offshore 
motivational processes  
We have so far observed that an organisations’ task allocation strategy affected 
onshore employees’ motivation to transfer tasks, and offshore employees’ motivation 
to stay with the firm. Importantly, our inductive analysis allowed us to reveal 
additional, far more complex, interrelations between task allocation strategy and 
motivational processes onshore and offshore, which have not been observed or 
implied in prior studies. We identify certain mutual dependencies, not only between 
the task allocation strategy and onshore motivational processes, but also between 
the strategy and offshore motivation, and between the motivational processes 
onshore and offshore. These mutual dependencies lead to a set of interlocking, self-
reinforcing circles, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Interdependence between task allocation strategy and onshore motivation.  
Our investigation revealed that the degree to which an organisation’s advanced task 
allocation strategy was perceived as ‘realistic’ influenced onshore employees’ 
expectations of performance and workload outcomes, and these outcome 
expectations, in turn, were prime motivators of actual task transfer. To illustrate, if 
onshore employees believed that the tasks that were planned to be offshored were in 
line with offshore employees’ skills, then they expected good performance outcomes 
and an acceptable workload, and they were consequently more inclined to transfer 
the tasks in line with the strategy. Furthermore, the task allocation strategy defined 
what tasks would remain at the onshore units, and therefore determined onshore 
employees’ expectations of their own career prospects. If these prospects were not 
clear and onshore employees feared losing interesting tasks, they were less 
motivated to actually transfer tasks as required by the strategy. The realisation of the 
task allocation strategy thus depended on motivational processes onshore, and we 
can identify a mutual dependency between the task allocation strategy and 
motivational processes onshore (see Figure 2, arrows linking task allocation strategy 
with motivation onshore and vice versa).  
 Interdependence between task allocation strategy and offshore 
motivation. As detailed before, the organisational task allocation strategy also 
played a major role in determining career expectations at the offshore units. It further 
affected offshore employees’ sense of task ownership and intrinsic task motivation, 
by defining how challenging and advanced offshore tasks would become. As 
described before, such career expectations, task ownership, and intrinsic motivation 
fed into offshore employees’ retention levels and task effort, both of which influenced 
offshore employees’ task performance. This performance, in turn, defined the 
success of the offshoring strategy. We can thus conclude that there was a mutual 
influence between the task allocation strategy and offshore motivational drivers (see 
Figure 2, arrows linking task allocation strategy with motivation offshore and vice 
versa). What is more, with increasing offshore performance, a company would be 
able to allocate even more advanced tasks to the offshore unit (provided that 
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onshore motivational processes were taken into account). We therefore argue that a 
self-reinforcing circle could be created over time (see Figure 2, circle 1). If the 
strategy of transferring increasingly advanced tasks lead to good offshore 
performance, the strategy could be developed further to allocate yet more advanced 
tasks to the offshore unit, which did in turn enhance offshore motivation, and this 
again fed into performance, continuing the circle at a higher level. For this dynamic to 
work, however, the task allocation strategy had to satisfy both offshore and onshore 
career ambitions, and thereby ensure that onshore and offshore motivational 
mechanisms were in line with each other. 
 Interdependence between onshore and offshore motivational processes. 
From our analysis of motivational processes onshore and offshore, it becomes 
apparent that also they were closely interlinked. Onshore employees’ outcome 
expectations affected the degree to which they transferred tasks to their offshore 
counterparts. This actual task transfer, in turn, affected offshore employees’ career 
expectations, task ownership and intrinsic motivation. As described before, these 
motivational drivers were important for offshore retention, task effort, and thereby 
affected offshore performance. This performance, in turn, was a crucial determinant 
of onshore employees’ outcome expectations regarding performance and workload, 
which fed into onshore employees’ motivation to transfer advanced tasks to their 
offshore counterparts, once more stimulating offshore motivation and performance. A 
UK member of EXPAT-TAX illustrated these dynamics as following:  
‘… you’ll see the more experienced people, they’ve really grasped it and really taken 
it upon themselves to try to get really involved in the clients and the accounts that 
they’re assigned to and as a result of that, they’re getting more work than just the 
basic “Prepare the computation this year!” They get to do other things as well, 
because they’ve embraced that.’ 
In this vein, the majority of Indian respondents in both firms put emphasis on how 
important it was to demonstrate their competence through high performance, and to 
make onshore employees aware of the Indians’ ambition to obtain more advanced 
tasks, in order to motivate onshore employees to transfer more higher level tasks 
(see Figure 1, arrows linking demonstrating competence and motivation with 
performance expectations and with actual task transfer). As an Indian member of 
AUTOCONTROL explained:  
‘What I saw was if you come up with questions and if you show that … you want to 
learn, they are okay. But if you do not approach them, they don’t come back to you 
with other projects.’ 
It becomes obvious that the interaction between onshore and offshore 
motivation was again two-way, and that through this interaction, another self-
reinforcing circle was created (see Figure 2, arrows linking motivation offshore with 
motivation onshore and vice versa; and circle 2). These mechanisms were 
particularly visible in the comparison between Indian employees who had been 
entrusted with demanding tasks and those who had not, as illustrated by a German 
AUTOCONTROL member:  
‘That can also be a kind of hen-and-egg problem…. Are they frustrated because we 
do not give them interesting tasks and do they not make an effort because of that, or 
do they give us the feeling that … they are not able to do it? Or do we not trust that 
they can do it? So what was there first? …The Indian colleague who you saw this 
morning had an interest and got involved in it. And because he got involved … and 
said: well, he would like to try doing this, doing that, we just gave him such things, 
and supported him.’ 
Submission #13564 
 
employees 
Interdependence between task allocation strategy, motivation onshore, 
and motivation offshore. If we take a broader perspective, we can discern a strong, 
circular interdependence between all three elements that we have focussed on so far: 
task allocation strategy, motivation onshore, and motivation offshore. These 
elements form a chain that affects offshore performance and thereby the success of 
a firm’s offshoring strategy.  
Firstly, the firm’s task allocation strategy influences onshore motivation, which 
determines actual task transfer, and, through this, motivational processes offshore, 
which are a determinant of performance. Moreover, the actual task transfer also 
feeds into performance simply by providing the necessary opportunity for offshore 
employees to gain relevant experience and background understanding, and thereby 
achieve good performance. Offshore performance, in turn, defines the degree to 
which an offshoring strategy is successful and will be developed further, to include 
yet more advanced tasks. We can thus identify a chain of conditions reaching from 
task allocation strategy over motivation onshore and motivation offshore back to the 
task allocation strategy (see Figure 2, inner arrows, and circle 3). Interestingly, 
offshore performance seems to function here as a major connective between all 
three elements of the chain. If we look at the chain towards the other direction, we 
can see that the task allocation strategy also affects offshore employees’ motivation, 
which co-determines their performance, feeding into onshore motivation and thereby 
the degree to which onshore employees put the strategy into practice (see Figure 2, 
outer arrows, and circle 4).  
We can infer that a particularly strong dynamic will be created if the elements 
in this chain accord which each other. If a task allocation strategy is not only realistic, 
but also satisfies both onshore and offshore career ambitions, it is likely to lead to 
strong motivations onshore as well as offshore, which both feed into performance. 
This performance will again underscore the task allocation strategy, which will 
reinforce the motivational processes onshore and offshore, leading to a continuation 
of the self-reinforcing circles (see Figure 2, circles 3 and 4). This allows for the 
important conclusion that a task allocation strategy which fosters onshore and 
offshore motivation to equal extents is more likely to be successful than a strategy 
which focuses on one of the two sides more than the other.  
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical contributions 
To our knowledge, this study is the first that combines a macro level view on 
organisational offshoring strategies with the micro-level perspective on motivational 
processes amongst onshore and offshore employees. Our research thereby 
responds to recent calls for more research on the micro-foundations of organisational 
strategy (e.g. Foss, 2011). A combined examination of macro and micro level 
processes is in general important for explaining variations in firm level behaviour and 
outcomes. Micro processes, at the level of individual and small group behaviour, can 
be fundamental reasons for differences in such firm level phenomena (see Abell, 
Felin, & Foss, 2008). In this vein, our dual level perspective on advanced task 
offshoring has allowed us to provide an in-depth explanation of variations in strategy 
implementation and success. 
At the macro level, we have identified certain organisational offshoring 
strategies which reflect the current trend towards transformational offshoring. Taking 
an activity based view of offshoring, we have detailed what kind of tasks were 
transferred (or planned to be transferred) to offshore units of two different industry 
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cases. We have also identified the factors that defined the cut-off points for offshoring 
in the two industries. In the automotive electronics firm as well as the professional 
services firm, a cut-off point was set by the physical location of the end customer. In 
the automotive case, an additional limitation was created by the highest level of 
required technical experience, which again was tied to the location of the end product. 
These cut-off points had important consequences for motivational processes 
amongst onshore and offshore employees, because they determined the upper limit 
for offshore employees’ career prospects, and, conversely, the degree to which 
onshore tasks and jobs would change in the future. 
 With regard to the micro level, we have demonstrated that the implementation 
and the success of a macro level advanced task transfer strategy depends on 
particular motivational processes onshore and offshore. Whilst some prior studies 
have highlighted the importance of motivational processes in onshore employees 
(Cohen & El Sawad, 2007; Mahadevan, 2011; Metiu, 2006; Zimmermann et al., 2012; 
Zimmermann & Ravishankar, 2013), we have pointed out that not only onshore 
employees’ motivation to transfer the tasks, but also their offshore counterparts’ 
motivation in terms of career expectations, intrinsic motivation, and self-efficacy 
determine whether the offshoring strategy will be implemented successfully. Like 
prior studies, we found that offshore employees were keen to take on advanced 
tasks, but in contrast to prior research, we found variations in their motivation to put 
effort into their task, depending on the degree to which advanced tasks were planned 
to be transferred and actually transferred. What is more, the onshore and offshore 
motivational processes were interrelated and thereby reinforced each other (see 
Figure 2).  
Compared to prior research on motivational mechanisms in offshoring , we 
have surfaced more generic motivational principles. Most of the previous studies 
describe motivational processes that emerge from the social dynamics between 
onshore and offshore employees, such as status closure (Metiu, 2001), post-colonial 
power re-negotiations (Mahadevan, 2011; Raviashankar et al., 2010), and 
uncertainties about the social order (Cohen & El Sawad, 2007). By contrast, we have 
identified motivational mechanisms in terms of outcome expectations, intrinsic task 
motivation, and self-efficacy. These are more fundamental drivers of human 
behaviours, and can therefore stem not only from interpersonal dynamics, but also 
from macro-level task allocation strategies. For example, expectations of career or 
task outcomes can emerge directly from the task allocation strategy rather than from 
social dynamics. Hence, by studying such generic motivational mechanisms, we 
were able to extend the social perspective on motivational processes and consider 
the influence of organisational level strategy on motivational processes. Our generic 
approach also allowed us to go a step further and detect the revers influence of 
motivational processes on the offshoring strategy. 
Our theory reaches a high level of complexity by pointing out the mutual, partly 
self-reinforcing interactions between strategy and motivation onshore and offshore. 
These interactions are important theoretically, because they make apparent how 
closely the macro and micro levels are tied to each other, and how limiting a view on 
either macro or micro level on their own would be. Only if we take the strategy and 
motivations into account alongside each other, we can achieve a fuller understanding 
of the variations in actual task transfer, and in offshore performance. We did not just 
reveal mutual interrelations between strategy and motivation, but we also highlighted 
a chain of self-reinforcing circles. This finding has additional theoretical implications. 
If a task allocation strategy creates career prospects and intrinsic task motivation 
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offshore, which in turn supports the successful implementation of the strategy, then 
this allows for a further development of the strategy, including yet more advanced 
task transfer to the offshore unit in the future. This mutual reinforcement between the 
offshoring strategy and motivational processes offshore means that the two can 
perpetuate each other over time. However, this self-reinforcing dynamic depends 
additionally on onshore motivational processes. The more the task allocation strategy 
creates positive outcome expectations onshore, the more it will be implemented, and 
this implementation is of course a condition for achieving the positive motivational 
effects on the offshore side. In this positive case, all three elements in the chain 
accord with each other to large extents. Hence, the two self-reinforcing circles 
between strategy and offshore motivation, and between motivational processes 
onshore and offshore, feed into each other. If this dynamic is created, a self-
reinforcing spiral is likely to emerge (Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995), leading to 
increasingly higher level task transfer over time, with sustained motivation onshore 
and offshore.  
Practical implications 
Our findings send several clear messages to managers who have to design an 
organisational task allocation strategy for offshoring. Whilst this offshoring strategy 
does of course have to satisfy organisational level calculations of benefits, costs, and 
risks, it also has to consider micro level motivational drivers. Firstly, onshore 
employees’ estimations of feasibility have to be taken into account. If onshore 
employees do not believe that the tasks to be transferred at a given point in time 
match onshore employees’ concurrent skill levels, the strategy is less likely to be 
implemented or successful. Sufficient time and capacity has to be allocated for 
recruitment, training, and continuous support of offshore employees until the required 
skill levels are reached. The match of offshore tasks and skills will also depend very 
much on the industry sector, as well as certain product characteristics in different 
departments of a firm. Our study suggests that financial services skills, such as tax, 
can be trained more easily compared to services for the high-tech industry, such as 
automotive engines, particularly if the work has to be carried out by graduates of a 
different subject (such as IT).  
An allocation of tasks that is perceived to be realistic, i.e. to achieve a match 
between tasks and skills offshore, has more potential to trigger an upward rather than 
downward spiral of offshore performance, onshore outcome expectations, and actual 
task transfer. However, such realistic task allocation has to be balanced with the 
need to provide sufficient career prospects for onshore as well as offshore 
employees. Even if a strategy is realistic in terms of the task-skill match, onshore 
employees may still not support it, if they feel that it endangers their own careers and 
jobs. However, if management sets the ceiling for advanced task transfer too low, 
employees at the offshore location may not see sufficiently challenging career 
prospects for themselves. They may therefore loose motivation on their jobs or even 
leave the firm, which can trigger the negative spiral of low offshore motivation, 
insufficient performance, and negative onshore outcome expectations, with the 
known consequences for strategy implementation and success. In order to avoid the 
negative spirals and yield positive ones, strategic managers thus have to take both a 
performance perspective and a career perspective, i.e. they have to design a 
strategy that is both realistic and satisfies onshore and offshore career expectations. 
hence, the aim has to be what one of the offshore managers in our study called a 
‘combined career pyramid’ for onshore and offshore employees.  
Limitations and future research 
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We have examined offshoring strategy and its motivational foundations across two 
different industry sectors and two different combinations of nationalities, and we have 
included the views of both onshore and offshore respondents. Given that we 
examined fundamental motivational mechanisms, we expect the model to be 
transferable to other sectors and countries. However, this remains to be scrutinised, 
and the model may have to be modified to account for different contexts. For 
example, there are likely to be different task allocation strategies and cut-off points 
for offshoring in other service sectors. By studying a broader range of sectors, future 
research could therefore define more general task characteristics and contextual 
factors that affect the feasibility and success of an offshoring strategy. For example, 
we have explained that the match between offshored tasks and skills depends on the 
education of graduates of certain subjects at the offshore destination, and their 
exposure to the end products and customers. We have demonstrated this with regard 
to IT for automotive electronics and tax services. Other sectors, however, such as 
legal and insurance services, will have other types of end customers and will draw on 
graduates from different subjects, which creates different profiles of skill 
requirements and available skills.  
Overall, our results encourage us to support recent calls for more research on the 
micro-foundations of strategy.  We have demonstrated how this can be done in the 
context of offshoring, by illuminating the motivational mechanisms that underscore 
the implementation and success of an offshoring strategy. Future research needs to 
take this inquiry a step a further, by expanding it to other contexts, and by including 
further micro-foundations of strategy in these contexts. 
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Table 1. Levels of task complexity and customisation in ELECTRO and PROFSERVICE 
 
Level of task complexity / customisation 
 
Offshoring timeline  
 
ELECTRO Coding 
Integration 
Software 
development 
 
System 
integration/expe
rt review 
(mature 
products), 
Project 
leadership 
(mature 
products) 
 
System 
integration/expe
rt review (new 
products), 
Project 
leadership (new 
products for 
Asian 
customers) 
 
Customer 
interface (Asian 
customers) 
 
Financial liability 
and 
accountability 
towards end 
customer (Asian 
customers) 
 
New function 
development 
(Asian customers) 
 
New function 
development (non-
Asian customers) 
Project leadership 
(new products for 
non-Asian 
customers),  
Customer interface 
(non-Asian 
customers) 
 
Financial liability 
and 
accountability 
towards end 
customer (non-
Asian customers) 
 
PROFSERVICE Compliance 
work: 
computations 
and returns 
 
First reviews 
 
Customer 
interface for 
standard 
information 
gathering (e-
mail) 
 
 
Customer interface 
for non-standard 
information 
gathering (face to 
face) 
 
Specialist tasks 
 
Final review, 
Sign off, 
Advisory work 
(lower level) 
 
Advisory work 
(higher level), 
Tax accounting, 
Auditing, 
New services 
development, 
Customer 
acquisition 
 
 
Low High 
Early stages Late stages 
Cut-off point 
PROFSERVICE  
Cut-off point 
ELECTRO 
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Figure 1: Interactions between onshore and offshore motivational processes of advanced task transfer  
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Upper management: 
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Figure 2: Interdependencies between Task allocation strategy, motivation onshore, and motivation offshore  
 
 
 
Interdependencies: 
1. Task allocation strategy and Motivation onshore  
2. Task allocation strategy and Motivation offshore  
3. Motivation onshore and Motivation offshore 
4. Interdependence between all three elements 
 
Task allocation 
strategy 
Motivation 
offshore 
Motivation 
onshore 
Actual task transfer 
Performance 
Match 
tasks/skills,  
Career 
prospects 
 
Execution 
of 
strategy 
Success of 
strategy 
Career 
prospects 
2 
1 
4 3 
